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JUVENILE COURT AND DIRECT APPEAL FROM
WAIVER OF JURISDICTION IN OHIO

ANY

DISCUSSION OF SPECIFIC ASPECTS

of juvenile law necessarily requires

that at least a brief inquiry be made into the history of its development. This becomes apparent when it is realized that juvenile law is not
the product of a neat and orderly background, but rather the result of
numerous sociological and economic conditions surrounding not only individual communities but the whole society. It is with this motivation that
the statutory creation of juvenile law builds and continues to thrive. And,
it is for this reason that this comment concerning the loss of the benefits
of the juvenile laws through waiver of jurisdiction, with emphasis on the
Ohio waiver statute' and its interpretation by the Ohio Supreme Court in
In re Becker,2 should begin with a thumbnail sketch of its background.
The first laws in the United States specifically designed to govern the
conduct of juveniles were implemented by the Illinois legislature on
April 21, 1899. 3 This statute and the ones which were to closely follow
in other states, 4 were born in a society surrounded with problems of mass
immigration, rapid and haphazard urbanization, and industrialization of
unprecedented dimensions. Social and legal reformers sought to offset
some of these conditions and remove the children from the rigid, technical,
and sometimes harsh justice of the adult criminal court, and place them in
the "protective" custody of the parent state.5 The goals were "to
investigate, diagnose, and prescribe treatment, not to adjudicate guilt or fix
blame," and in this light "children were not to be treated as criminals nor
dealt with by the process used for criminals." This "rehabilitative spirit"
was best described by Julian Mack in 1909:
The problem for determination by the judge is not, Has this boy or
girl committed a specific wrong, but What is he, how has he become
what he is, and What had best be done in his interest and
in the
7
interest of the state to save him from a downward career?

I Omo REv.CODE ANN. §2151.26 (Page Supp. 1973).
2 39 Ohio St 2d 84, 314 N.E.2d 158 (1974).
3
Juvenile Court Act, ILL. LAWS, 1899.
4 Ohio's first juvenile laws were enacted in 1902 and became general with subsequent
enactments in 1904 and 1906. See Young, A Synopsis of Ohio Juvenile Court Law,
31 U. CiN. L. REv. 131, 135 (1962). By 1917, 46 states had enacted similar juvenile
legislation. See Willey, Ohio's Post-Gault Juvenile Court Law, 3 AKRON L. REV. 152,
n.2 (1970), citing R.NYQuIST, JuvENmLE JusrICE 114 (1960).
5See generally A. M. PLATr, THE CHILD SAVERS, 123-34 (1969).
e PRESmENT'S COMM'N ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,

TAsK FORCE REPORT: JuvENn.E DELiNQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 3 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FoRcE REPORT].
7Comment, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L REv. 104, 119-120 (1909).
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1. JUVENILES AND THE STATE

The Doctrine of ParensPatriae
The jurisdiction of the state is based primarily on the assumption of
the power of parens patriae.8 This doctrine was initially developed in the
English court of chancery, where the chancellor acted as the personal
representative of the crown exercising this prerogative to aid unfortunate
minors. The underlying basis of this jurisdiction is somewhat unclear;
but, the execution of this presumed authority generally took form
in the assumption of the duties of maintenance and protection which
resided in the minor's parents.9
In retrospect the derivation of parens patriae seems to have been an
improper exercise of jurisdiction and this fact has been the subject of
comment and criticism. 10 Nevertheless, this doctrine was accepted at an
early date by the states and continues as a statutorily sanctioned basis for
the exercise of jurisdiction over minors." Through these statutes, each
state legislature has devised a separate specialized court and method of
procedure for exercising jurisdiction whenever the interest of the state
is determined to be better served by governmental interference.
These juvenile courts no longer operated through the principles of
chancery or entirely under common law principles, but rather in a
semblance of equity by statute. Generally, the procedures instituted in
these courts were intended to be as informal and non-adversarial as
possible, in keeping with their stated purpose of "saving" rather than
punishing the child. Consequently, proceedings involving juveniles were
described as "civil not criminal";U the juvenile offender was classified as
delinquent not criminal;13 and, the juvenile was entitled only to the basic
8

Literally translated as "father of his country." See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1269
(4th rev. ed. 1968).
9 See FLEXNER & OPPENHEIMER, THE LEGAL ASPECT OF THE JUVENILE COURT 7

(1922). See also State ex rel. Fortini v. Hoffman, 12 Ohio App. 341, 344, 32 Ohio CL
App. 193, 196 (1920) (offering an excellent historical outline of the development of

juvenile law); S. DAvis, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES 1-5 (1974).

10 See, e.g., Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23
SuP. CT. L. Rsv. 205 (1971); Cogan, Juvenile Law Before and After the Entrance of
Parens Patriae,22 Sup.CT. L. REv. 147 (1970).
11InOhio, parens patriae has been used for the purposes of commitment since 1869.
See Prescott v. State, 19 Ohio St. 184 (1869). See also House of Refuge v. Ryan, 37

Ohio St. 197 (1881) (involving a petition in habeas corpus for release of a committed
minor, which, on appeal, was upheld under this doctrine).

12 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554
(1966).

See also Holmes' Appeal, 379 Pa. 599, 601, 109 A.2d 523, 525 (1954)

(referring to a juvenile proceeding as a "civil inquiry or action looking to treatment,
reformation and rehabilitation of the minor child..."); Cope v. Campbell, 175 Ohio
St. 475, 196 N.E.2d 457 (1964); In re Benn, 18 Ohio App. 2d 97, 247 N.E.2d 335
(1969); State v. Shardell, 107 Ohio App. 338, 153 N.E.2d 510 (1958).

13 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 23 (1967). The definition of a "delinquent child" in
Ohio is found in OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.02 (Page Supp. 1973). The juvenile
court may also designate a juvenile a Juvenile Traffic Offender-OHIo REv. CODE
ANN. § 2151.021 (Page Supp. 1973), Unruly Child-OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §
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14
right of fair treatment in the proceedings. Thus, the courts were given
the fullest of control and authority in making decisions as to treatment,
while avoiding the substantive and procedural problems found in the
criminal law.' 5

It was felt that when the common law doctrine of parens patriae was
linked with this form of statutory equity the application of constitutional
safeguards was unnecessary.
There is no probability, in the proper administration of the law, of
the child's liberty being unduly invaded. Every statute which is
designed to give protection, care, and training to children, as a
needed substitute for parental authority and performance of parental
duty, is but a recognition of the duty of the state, as the legitimate
guardian and protector of children where other guardianship fails..., 1
This philosophy, of course, resulted in an enormous amount of power
being centered in the juvenile courts, particularly in the individual juvenile
judges. One eminent authority, in an observation of the situation as it
existed in 1909, made the candid remark that "[t]he powers of the Star
Chamber were a trifle in comparison with those of our juvenile courts....1.7
It is almost axiomatic that where great discretion exists, abuses of
discretion, or at least major inequities, will also exist. The juvenile justice
system is no exception. Perhaps emphasis should have been placed upon
the phrase "proper administration of the law" in the preceding quotation,
for it is a crucial assumption. Generally we think of constitutional
procedural safeguards as defining the meaning of this phrase. By excluding
them from consideration in juvenile cases it is virtually insured that some
inequities will arise. Yet, to introduce them full force into juvenile
proceedings would be to transform them into proceedings so closely
approximating those of the criminal system that their protective and
rehabilitative aspects could be forfeited. While this certainly presents a
dilemma of considerable dimension in a vital arena of governmental and
2151.022 (Page Supp. 1973), Neglected Child-Omo

REv. CODE

ANN. § 2151.03

(Page Supp. 1973), or Dependent Child-OHio RaV. CODE ANN. § 2151.04 (Page
Supp. 1973). All of the above definitions became effective in 1969.
See Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1959). This case established
a due process standard for determining which constitutional guarantees were applicable
to juveniles. This standard was later modified and used by the Supreme Court in Gault.
15 See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14-26 (1967). See also F. A. ALLEN, THE
14

BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE

50-61 (1964).

Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 56-57, 62 A. 198, 201 (1905). Contra, In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967): "... neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of
Rights is for adults alone." See generally Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender,
41 MINN. L. RPv. 547 (1957) (suggesting that constitutional rights which are in
conflict with parens patriae must give way).
17R. Pound, Foreword to P. YOUNG, SOCIAL TREATMENT IN PROBATION AND DELINQUENCY (1952). See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 (1967), also citing the text
accompanying this note.
16

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1975

3

Akron Law Review, Vol. 8 [1975], Iss. 3, Art. 11

AKRON LAw REVIEW

[Vol. 8:3

societal concern,' 8 it is far from insoluble. An examination of the approach
utilized by the Supreme Court in several major juvenile cases is not only
instructive but earmarks a path to the potential solution.
II. GATEWAY TO CONSTITUTIONAL RECOGNITION:
THE SUPREME COURT

Kent v. United States and Due Process
In Kent v. United States,'9 the Supreme Court decided the first in a
progression of cases that would define a number of the bounds of juvenile
rights. Morris Kent, Jr., was arrested in 1961 at 16 years of age on
charges of housebreaking, robbery, and rape in the District of Columbia."o
Because of his age, he was subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
juvenile court. Without a hearing and over protestations of counsel, who
had offered to show that Kent was suffering from a mental disorder and
that he would be a suitable subject for rehabilitation if given proper
treatment, the juvenile court judge waived jurisdiction and ordered the
youth bound over to the regular procedure of the District of Columbia.
He made no findings and did not recite any reason for the waiver.21
Kent was subsequently convicted of all of the offenses mentioned
above, excluding rape. On appeal based on the allegedly improper
waiver, 22 the court of appeals expressed the opinion that the exclusive
method of reviewing the juvenile court's waiver order was a motion to
dismiss the indictment in the district court, and affirmed Kent's conviction.
18 The foremost items inducing such concern seem to be the increased rates of crime
and recidivism recently evident in the juvenile population. See Wizner, The Child and
the State: Adversaries in the Juvenile Justice System, 4 COLUM. HUMAN RIG-TS L.
REV. 389, 393 (1972), citing F. A. ALLEN, THE BoRDERLINTE OF CRIMINAL JusTicE

43-50 (1964); Leonard, LEAA and Federal Delinquency Control Programs, 23
JUVENILE JUSTICE 7, 8 (Aug. 1972). As noted by Senator Birch Bayh: "... [O]ur
juvenile justice system is too often a revolving door which for many ultimately leads
to the adult criminal justice system and a lifetime of criminal behavior." Bayh,
Juveniles v. Justice, 4 COLUM. HUMAN RiGoTs L. REV. 309, 313 (1972). The total
number of cases handled by the Ohio juvenile courts has steadily been on the
increase at a rate which is not necessarily correlative to the total number of persons
comprising the juvenile population. For further numerical data see OHIO DEPT. OF
MENTAL HYGIENE AND CONVICTION, OHIO JUVENILE COURT STATISTICS, which is
published annually. See also Note, A Proposalfor the More Effective Treatment of
the "Unruly" Child in Ohio: The Youth Services Bureau, 39 U. CiN. L REV. 275,
275-81 (1970)4
19 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
20 The history of this case is offered by the Court at 383 U.S. at 542-50. It is there
noted that Kent was on probation at the time of his arrest and indictment from
charges stemming from housebreakings and attempted purse snatchings in 1959, when
he was 14 years old.
XL383 U.S. at 546. The juvenile judge apparently felt that as interpreted in Wilhite
v. United States, 281 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1960), the District of Columbia waiver
statute required only a "full investigation" and not a hearing on the matter of
waiver. He recited in the order that after "full investigation, I do hereby waive
[jurisdiction]."
22Kent v. Reid, 316 F.2d 331 (D.C. Cir. 1963), rev'd sub nom. Kent v. United
States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
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The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded the case
for a new hearing on the waiver order in juvenile court. In rendering its
decision, the Court found that "the waiver of jurisdiction is a 'critically
important' action determining vitally important statutory rights of
the juvenile [and thus the waiver hearing] ... must measure up to the
essentials of due process and fair treatment."
This guarantee of due
process was found to afford certain procedural protections, namely: the
right to a hearing; the right to counsel at the hearing; that the attorney be
granted access to all records relating to the juvenile, and the right to a
statement by the court of the reasons for the decision. 24 The Court in so
doing rejected the view that parens patriae and the "civil v. criminal"
rationale was sufficient reason to disregard all constitutional rights. The
Court did not express the view that this meant a total application of all
the requirements of a criminal trial or even an administrative hearing.
Although Kent has been interpreted by some courts as having been
decided purely on the grounds of a statutory interpretation of the District
of Columbia code, rather than constitutional due process grounds,Z the
opinion did set out eight basic criteria that can be used by the juvenile
judge when considering a waiver of jurisdiction. These have been written
into many of the state statutes in whole or in part to satisfy the "essentials
of due process and fair treatment." They are:
(1) the seriousness of the alleged offense against the community and
whether the protection of the community requires waiver;
(2) whether the alleged 6ffense was committed in an aggressive,
violent, premeditated, or willful manner;
(3) whether the alleged offense was against persons or property;
(4) the prospective merit of the complaint;
(5) the desirability of trial and disposition in one court where the
juvenile's associates in the commission of the offense are adults;
(6) the maturity of the juvenile as determined by consideration of
criteria such as his home life, environmental situation, emotional attitude,
and pattern of living;
(7) the record and previous history of the juvenile; and,
(8) the prospects for adequate protection of the public and the
6
likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation.9
2

383 U.S. at 556, 562.

24 Id. at 557.

3See State v. Steinhauer, 216 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 1968); People v. Jiles, 43 InI. 2d 145,
251 N.E.2d 529 (1969); Cradle v. Peyton, 208 Va. 243, 156 S.E.2d 874 (1967).

Contra, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); United States ex rel. Turner v. Rundle, 438

F.2d 839, 841 (3d Cir. 1971): "[lIt is our view that Kent, particularly in light of the
Supreme Court's subsequent opinion in In re Gault ...sets forth certain principles of

constitutional dimension." See also State v. Yoss, 10 Ohio App. 2d 47, 225, N.E.2d
275 (1967).
26 383 U.S. at 566-67, an appendix to the majority opinion by Justice Fortas. See, e.g.,
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.26 (Page Supp. 1973) and OHIo R. Juv. P. 30; ILL.
ANN.STAT. ch. 37, § 702-7 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974).
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In speaking for the majority, Justice Fortas viewed the situation from
a realistic point of view and questioned whether the system worked at
all: "... . There is evidence in fact, that there may be grounds for concern
that the child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the
protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative
treatment postulated for children." 2 7
The Gault Decision2
In 1964, Gerald Gault, 15 years of age, was picked up by the Sheriff
of Gila County, Arizona, on a verbal complaint alleging he had made a
lewd and obscene phone call to a neighbor. No notice that Gerald was
being taken into custody was conveyed to his mother or even left at his
home 'by the authorities. The youth was subsequently brought before the
appropriate juvenile court having jurisdiction over him by reason of his
age. A hearing was held. However, neither Gerald nor his mother was
ever given advance notice of the charges against him. Neither the youth
nor his parent was ever informed of any constitutional rights which he
might 'have possessed. In fact, the complaining neighbor who had
allegedly received the phone call never appeared in court, nor did she
ever talk to the juvenile judge regarding her complaint.29 The judge found
Gerald to be delinquent by reason of his violation of an Arizona
misdemeanor statute prohibiting the use of obscene language over the
telephone and committed him to the State Industrial School "for
30
the period of his minority.. ." a six-year sentence.
A petition of habeas corpus was brought in the state courts
challenging the constitutionality of the delinquency proceedings. After
a hearing on the petition, the Superior Court dismissed the writ and the
appellants sought review in the Arizona Supreme Court, which also
dismissed the writ, finding that the requisite constitutional due process
requirements had been met.31
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, ruling that the due
process clause applied in juvenile court proceedings when a determination
is to be made as to "whether a juvenile is a 'delinquent' as a result of
alleged misconduct on his part, with the consequence that he may be
committed to a state institution." 32 The Court thus limited its finding
to the adjudicatory stage of proceedings which present a possibility of
383 U.S. at 556. Justice Fortas is certainly not alone in these convictions as can
readily be found throughout TAsK FORcE REPORT, supra note 6. See generally Wizner,
The Child and the State: Adversaries in the Juvenile Justice System, 4 COLUM.
HuMA.N RIGHTs L. REV. 389, 392-93 (1972); Ketcham, The Unfulfilled Promise of
the Juvenile Court, 7 Cuimm AND DEL. 97, 102-03 (1967).
28
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
291d. at 7.
30 Id. at 7-9. The penalty actually prescribed by the Arizona misdemeanor statute was
a fine of $5 to $50, or imprisonment for not more than two months.
31
In re Gault, 99 Ariz. 181, 407 P.2d 760 (1965), rev'd 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
82 387 U.S. at 13.
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incarceration. The Court also found that a juvenile is entitled to certain
specific due process rights, namely: the right to notice which complies
with constitutional due process requirements;33 the right to counsel; 3 4 the
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination; 35 and, absent a valid
the right to
confession adequate to support a delinquency adjudication,
36
confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses.
One of the most important and relevant portions of the opinion is
found in the reaffirmation of its position in Kent toward the relationship
between parenspatriae and constitutional guarantees:
In Kent v. United States, supra, we stated that the Juvenile Court
Judge's exercise of the power of the state as parens patriae was not
unlimited. We said that "the admonition to function in a 'parental'
relationship is not an invitation to procedural arbitrariness."... We
announced with respect to such waiver proceedings that.. ."the
hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair
treatment." We reiterate this view, here in connection with a juvenile
court adjudication of "delinquency," as a requirement which is
part of the Due 3 7Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of
our Constitution.
As Justice Harlan perceived it, the stress should be placed on
determining the forms of procedural protection necessary to guarantee
the "fundamental fairness" of juvenile proceedings. 38 This opinion seems
to suggest the desirability of a delicate balance of supplying rehabilitation
and reformation while not denying constitutional procedures guaranteeing
"fundamental fairness" and replacing the same with the arbitrary
imbalance of a non-adversarial and completely informal proceeding.

Id. at 23-24, described in other terms as that which would be "constitutionally
adequate in a civil or criminal proceeding." See, e.g., Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196
(1948) (criminal notice); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306 (1950) (civil notice).
34 387 U.S. at 41. For a recent expression of the constitutional right to counsel in
adult criminal cases involving the possibility of even minimal incarceration, see
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). Although this article will not deal with
the right of the juvenile defendant to defend himself in the action against him by the
state, the circuit courts appear to be in disagreement as to the propriety of such a
situation in adult criminal proceedings. Compare United States v. Pike, 439 F.2d 695
(9th Cir. 1971) (holding that the defendant does have a right of pro se representation) with United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that
there is no right to pro se representation in criminal actions even though a majority
of state constitutions appear to guarantee this right).
35 387 U.S. at 47, at which is found the following language: "It would indeed be
surprising if the privilege against self-incrimination were available to hardened
criminals but not to children."
38 387 U.S. at 56.
37Id. at 30.
38387 U.S. 1, 74-75 (Harlan. J., concurring opinion).
33
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Winship and McKeiver39
In re Winship 4° involved a youth who had been found delinquent on
a standard of proof lower than "proof beyond a reasonable doubt," which
is required in adult criminal proceedings.4 The state juvenile court there
relied on the New York statute dealing with the subject of delinquency
proceedings," which not only authorized, but mandated the standard of
proof of "a preponderance of the evidence" for such proceedings.
The Supreme Court determined that in procedures involving a
juvenile who is charged with an offense which would be a crime if
committed by an adult, "the same considerations that demand extreme
caution in fact-finding to protect the innocent adult apply as well to the
innocent child." Justice Brennan, who delivered the majority opinion,
did examine the historical significance and importance of the reasonable
doubt standard in the operation of the criminal law." It should be noted
however, that Winship was also carefully limited to the adjudicatory stage
of proceedings in which the juvenile could be deprived of his freedom.'
Thus, the majority opinion in Winship emphasizes the narrowness of
the application of the reasonable doubt standard, intimating "no view
concerning the constitutionality of procedures governing children 'in need
of supervision.' "4 The procedures involving the unruly or ungovernable,
dependent, or neglected child are not affected. 47 Furthermore, the Court
insisted that it did not see how the application of the safeguard of the
reasonable doubt standard would compel the states to abandon or displace
any of the substantive benefits of the juvenile process,4 which were
described as: the non-criminal nature of the proceeding; the informality,
flexibility and speed of the hearing; the discretion in the use of treatment
techniques; and, the prehearing intake procedures. 4
The Court seemed to indicate, at least by implication, that a
balancing process based on the standard of "fair treatment" 50 would not
39 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).

40 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
41
In re Winship, 24 N.Y.2d 196, 247 N.E.2d 253, 299 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1969), rev'd
397 U.S. 358 (1970).
42NEw YORK FAMIy COURT Acr § 744(b) (McKinney 1962).
"397 U.S. at 365.
44See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958); Holland v. United
States, 348 U.S. 121, 138 & n.7 (1954); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174
(1949). See also 22 CASE W. Rys. L. REv. 115, 116 (1970).
45 397 U.S. at 358, 366.
46 Id.at 359.
47 See note 13 supra.
4397 U.S. at 367. But see 397 U.S.

358,

376 (Burger, C.J., dissenting opinion)

(asserting what the Chief Justice considered a conflict between the majority decision
in Winship and the intentions of the several legislatures to create benevolent and less
formal institutions).
49 397 U.S. at 366-67.
50 See note 14 supra and accompanying text
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automatically result in the application of all the guarantees in the
Bill of Rights to juvenile procedures.
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania51 seems to uphold the view of the majority
in Winship that the total incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the
juvenile system is not the ultimate destiny of Kent, Gault, Winship and
its progeny. It seems clear, as the result of McKeiver, that the Court will
use a theory of "selective incorporation" when dealing with the Bill of
Rights as applied to the states through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, 52 or with other fundamentally recognized rights.
The sole issue presented for determination in McKeiver was, "whether
there is a constitutional right to a jury trial in juvenile court."' ' The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed McKeiver's conviction by the
single juvenile judge, concluding that the addition of a trial by jury
"might well destroy the traditional character of juvenile proceedings," and
further expressed the opinion "that a properly structured and fairly
administered juvenile court system can serve our present societal needs
without infringing on individual freedoms." 54
In 1971, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the
decision 55 and held that there is no guarantee of the right to trial by
jury in juvenile courts even in cases where the offense charged would
be a felony if committed by an adult or where the juvenile's loss of
freedom is possibly at stake.5
51403 U.S. 528 (1971).
52 This seems to be holding true not only in juvenile law, but in other areas of the law
as well. See, e.g., San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Compare
Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
For a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1972) with Tribe, Foreword:
Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1
(1973), for an excellent review of the subject, although containing differing predictions for future standards of review and use of the fourteenth amendment. See also
Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection GuaranteeProhibited,Neutral, and Permissive Classifications,62 GEO. LJ. 1071 (1974).
53
1n re Terry, 438 Pa. 339, 342, 265 A.2d 350, 352 (1970), aff'd sub nom. In re
McKeiver, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). Joseph McKeiver, then age 16, was charged under
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4704, § 4807, and §4917 (1963), with robbery, larceny, and
receiving stolen goods in 1968, all of which were felonies. He was subsequently
convicted before a single juvenile judge, his counsel's motion for a jury trial having
been denied. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed without opinion at 215 Pa.
Super. 760, 255 A.2d 921 (1969).
5 438 Pa. at 350,265 A.2d at 355-56.
55 403 U.S. at 551.
5
eSee In re Alger, 19 Ohio St. 2d 70, 249 N.E.2d 808 (1969) (construing OHIo REv.
CODE ANN. § 2151.35 (Page 1968) as constitutional even though providing no right
to a trial by jury). Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.35 was amended effective November
19, 1969, although the statute still reads: "The court shall hear and determine all
cases of children without a jury." OHio Rav. CODE ANN. § 2151.35 (Page Supp.
1973). Accord, In re Baker, 18 Ohio App. 2d 276, 248 N.E.2d 620 (1969). But se*
State v. Fisher, 17 Ohio App. 2d 183, 245 N.E.2d 358 (1969) (concerning repealed
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.35(E) (Page 1968), which specifically prescribed
commitment to the Ohio State Reformatory, an adult penal institution).
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In its consideration, the Court found that the requirement of a jury
trial: (1) would remake the juvenile proceeding into a fully adversary
process putting an end to the idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal
protective proceeding;5 7 (2) would not remedy the defects of the
system;8 (3) would disallow any further experimentation by the states
59
to seek new ways to solve the problems of the young; and, (4) would
bring with it into that system the traditional delay, formality, and clamor
60
of the adversary system, and possibly, the public trial. Thus, the decision
rested on the Court's finding from the totality of the circumstances that
a regressive effect would result from constitutionally guaranteeing the
right to a jury trial with the consequence actually being a "[loss of] what
has been gained, and tending once again to place the juvenile squarely
in the routine of the criminal process."61
The effect of the Supreme Court decisions in Kent, Gault, and
Winship has been to offer new insight into the workings of the juvenile
system. McKeiver should not be read as retarding the progress of this
viewpoint. It should be interpreted as a meaningful limitation placed on
the application of constitutional principles to the juvenile field evidencing
the Court's desire to continue with a rehabilitative outlook.
While the consolidation of the aforementioned cases does not
establish what might be termed a firm constitutional test capable of
uniform and determinative application, four principles seem to emerge as
prospective guidelines: (1) procedures essential to "fundamental fairness"
are not to be disposed of merely because of rehabilitative and benevolent
aims; (2) that these procedures which are essential will not distract from
those original benevolent and rehabilitative aims; (3) the Court is not
prepared to dispose of the juvenile system by totally incorporating guarantees of the Bill of Rights which would, in reality, defeat these aims of
rehabilitation and add little to "fundamental fairness"; and, (4) the Court
will concern itself only with the adjudicatory phase of the proceedings,
all other phases seemingly too close to real treatment and rehabilitation,
and subject only to fair treatment as defined by the state.
Any set of guidelines which may reasonably be drawn from the
consideration of these four major Supreme Court decisions must of
necessity be somewhat broad. However, it seems fair to assert that these
decisions reflect a recognition on the part of the Court of the continued
value of the maintenance of separate juvenile justice systems based upon
protective and rehabilitative, rather than punitive, ideals. It seems clear
that the guidelines spelled out in these cases are meant to complement
rather than displace the "special rights" afforded children in juvenile
57 403 U.S. at 545.
58 Id.

at 547.

59 Id.

60 Id. at 550.
6 Id. at 547.
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court proceedings. It is with these guidelines in mind that we should
proceed to an analysis and evaluation of Ohio juvenile procedure and
its system of waiving juvenile court jurisdiction.
III.

DIRECT APPEAL FROM WAIVER OF JURISDICTION IN OHIO

Statutory Rights of Juveniles in Ohio
The "special rights" of children under Ohio's juvenile justice system
are readily apparent upon examination of the basic procedure involved in
bringing a child within the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court, the
ultimate dispositions made by the juvenile court, and the manner in which
an order waiving the court's jurisdiction is carried out as controlled by
statute in Ohio. 62 The Juvenile Code provides that "any person" may
swear out and file a complaint against a juvenile in the county in which
63
the child resides or where the offense was committed. Section 2151.27
states that although the complaint may be based on information and
belief, it must allege the particular facts upon which the allegation of
delinquency, traffic offender, unruliness, neglect or dependency is based.
A juvenile can also be taken into custody by police in all cases in
4
which the police could arrest an adult for the same offense. After
custody, however, the proceedings regarding juveniles in custody are to be
initially held in the juvenile court.6 5
When a child is thus brought before the juvenile court, an intake
officer must initially make an investigation. Following this investigation,
the officer must release the child unless detention seems warranted or
required under Section 2151.31.66 If the juvenile is so detained under
67
Section 2151.314, a complaint is filed and a hearing must be had within
68
72 hours to determine if the detention is necessary or required. Under
62

OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.01-.41 (Page 1968 and Page Supp. 1973). See
particularly Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.23 (Page Supp. 1973), which is the

jurisdictional section of the Ohio Juvenile Court Code. See Willey, Ohio's Post-Gault
Juvenile Court Law, 3 AKRON L. REV. 152 (1970).
63
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.27 (Page Supp. 1973).
64 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.31 (Page Supp. 1973). This section provides that such
action is not deemed to be an arrest except for the purpose of determining its
constitutional validity: "A child may be taken into custody: (B) Pursuant to the laws
of arrest;..." (emphasis added). See also OHio R. Juv. P.7.
65 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.25 (Page Supp. 1973). Provision is also made in this
section for the discontinuance of proceedings and the transfer of the case to juvenile
court if the child is taken before another competent court of the state.
66 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.314 (Page Supp. 1973). OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.31
(Page Supp. 1973) reads in pertinent part: ". .. A child taken into custody shall not
be detained or placed in shelter care prior to the hearing on the complaint unless his
detention or care is required to protect the person or property of others or those of
the child, or because the child may abscond or be removed from the jurisdiction
of the court, ... or because an order for his detention or shelter care has been made
by the court pursuant to this chapter."
6
7 See Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.27 (Page Supp. 1973).
68
According to OHio R. Juv. P. 7(F) (3) the juvenile court may hear any evidence
without regard to the formal rules of evidence at this preliminary hearing.
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Section 2151.314, reasonable notice must be given to the parents,
guardian, or custodian of the juvenile, as well as to the juvenile himself;
and, the parties must be informed of their right to counsel at this
preliminary hearing on temporary commitment. If the parties are unable
69
to afford counsel, one will be appointed by the court.
Although there is no explicit statutory right to be shielded from
publicity, the general purpose of the juvenile statutes, as outlined in
Section 2151.01, would seem to demand this.o The pressures on both
the juvenile and the officers of the court, which are necessarily coincidental
to public display, can hardly be termed conducive to rehabilitation in
the hope of checking his downward career.
The juvenile may not be kept or jailed in a facility intended primarily
to house adult offenders, except where almost quarantine-like surroundings
are provided which allow the juvenile to neither see, hear, nor come into
contact with an adult offender.71 Likewise, he may not be fingerprinted or
photographed (a common procedure for adults) except for identification
purposes, or with the permission of the juvenile judge.72 If fingerprints or
photographs are taken, they are to be transferred to the juvenile court
7
where they become a part of the youth's confidential file.
As previously stated, a juvenile taken into custody by police pursuant
to the laws of arrest is not considered under arrest, except for the purpose
of testing the constitutional validity of that custody. 4 Thus, a juvenile
would not compile an "arrest record" unless the juvenile court waives its
jurisdiction. Although a juvenile may acquire an official record, which
would include the actual adjudicatory measures and procedures and an

Omo K Juv. P.
7(F) (1), (2), and (3). See generally Lehman, A Juvenild's Right to Counsel in a
Delinquency Hearing, 17 Juv. CT. JuDGE's J. 53 (1966); Riederer, The Role of
Counsel in the Juvenile Court, 2 J. F.s. LAw 16 (1962) (each dealing extensively
with the juvenile's right to counsel in the pre-Gault era).
7
OSee Allstate Ins. Co. v. Cook, 324 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1963).
71Omo REv. CoDE ANN.§ 2151.34 (Page Supp. 1973):
Treatment of children in custody; detention home. No child under 18 years
of age shall be placed in or committed to any prison, jail, or lockup, nor shall
such child be brought into any police station, vehicle, or other place where such
child can come in contact or communication with any adult convicted of crime
or under arrest and charged with crime..."
69 See OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.314, § 2151.352 (Page Supp. 1973);

See Omo R. Juv. P. 7(H).
7 OHIo REv. CODE ANN.§ 2151.313 (Page Supp. 1973). However, fingerprints may be
taken by law enforcement officers investigating an act which would be a felony if
committed by an adult where there is probable cause to believe the youth is involved.
See generally Ferster and Courtless, The Beginning of Juvenile Justice, Police Practices
and the Juvenile Offender, 22 VAND. L. R.ev. 567 (1969) (criticizing the maintenance
of fingerprint files by the police and the personnel having access to the same).
73
OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.313 (Page Supp. 1973).
7
4 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.31(D) (Page Supp. 1973), which reads in part: "Taking
a child into custody shall not be deemed an arrest except for the purpose of deter-

mining its validity under the constitution of this state or of the United States."
(Emphasis added). See text accompanying note 64, supra. See generally S. DAvis,
RiGors OF JuvEamEs 38-54 (1974).
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unofficial record, which would include the reports and tests made by intake
officers and other court officials, these juvenile records are all subject to
expungement upon application by the person to the court or upon the
court's own motion following a period of two years after the termination of
an order of the court or the child's release from a state treatment facility.7
In addition, any orders made by the court prescribing commitment
can continue only until the child reaches the age of 21 years. 7 The wide
discrepancy in the possible commitment period between the juvenile laws
and incarceration under the criminal code is generally evidenced by the
sentence initially imposed in Kent. If Kent had been adjudicated under
the juvenile code of the District of Columbia his maximum commitment
would have been for five years or until 21 years of age; whereas, he was
in fact sentenced to 30 to 90 years under the criminal code after waiver
7
was ordered and the jurisdiction of the juvenile court relinquished.
In In re Whittington, the Fifth District Court of Appeals of Ohio
concluded "that the Juvenile Code was established to afford valuable
rights to juveniles." 78 The juvenile rights as set out in the Ohio Revised
Code are indeed valuable as tools in tailoring informal and flexible
juvenile procedures, this presumably being the original intention of the
legislature in creating a separate system to deal with juveniles. The
approach is both realistic and practicable, dictating an avoidance of the
stigma attaching to criminal procedure which is so detrimental in attempts
to foster an atmosphere conducive to effective rehabilitation.
Waiver of Jurisdiction
While critically important, these rights are not absolute. Prior to the
adjudicatory, fact-finding stage, the process begins which will ultimately
determine whether an order to relinquish the juvenile court's jurisdiction
for the purpose of criminal prosecution should issue from the court.79
75 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.358 (Page Supp. 1973). However, the right here is not
automatic and in reality operates only for those with sufficient interest, understanding
of its consequences, and money to proceed under the statute. Whatever stigmatizing
effect a juvenile record might have, it is inconsequential when compared to a criminal

arrest record after the juvenile court waives jurisdiction. See, e.g., Menard v. Mitchell,
430 F.2d 486, 490 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (the mere fact of arrest limits opportunity for
schooling, employment, and professional licenses). See generally J. Coffee, Privacy

v. Parens Patriae:The Role of Police Records in the Sentencing and Surveillance of
Juveniles, 57 CORNELL L REV. 571, 591-94 (1972) (dealing with the realistic effect on
prospective employers and employment agencies); Comment, Juvenile Police RecordKeeping, 4 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 461 (1972) (statutory assurances of
confidentiality are illusory because of the nature of the treatment given to juvenile
records); TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 92-93.
76 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.38 (Page Supp. 1973).

7See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 550 (1966). But see note 30, supra, and
accompanying text.
7817 Ohio App. 2d 164, 177, 245 N.E.2d 364, 372 (1969).
79 See Omo REv.CODE ANN. § 2151.26(A) (Page Supp. 1973):
After a complaint has been filed alleging that a child is delinquent by reason of
having committed an act which would constitute a felony if committed by an
adult, the court at a hearing may transfer the case for criminal prosecution to
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When a juvenile is so transferred to the criminal court for adjudication
8
as an adult, the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is "abated" 0 and each
and every one of the aforementioned statutory rights is forfeited. Rights
which are, as indicated by the Whittington court, so valuable and
important to the juvenile process, should be jealously guarded by society,
and every attempt should be made to protect them from being lost through
an arbitrary or even an unintentionally inappropriate order. Section
2151.26, which deals with the waiver process, attempts to preclude such a
result, and shows the effect of Gault and Kent in requiring a hearing,
82
8
notice thereof at least three days prior to the hearing, ' counsel, and
a written finding of facts which includes a statement of reasons for
8
transfer if one is actually made. 3 These due process requirements meet
those set up in Kent and Gault for determining the " 'critically important'
question of whether a child will be deprived of the special protections
8
and provisions of the Juvenile Court Act." 4
Section 2151.26 also prescribes the criteria that are to be used in
deciding whether to transfer the case. These criteria essentially represent
the Ohio legislature's recognition that rehabilitation and treatment are not
suitable for some juveniles. Before issuing the transfer order, the court
must find that: (1) the act would be a felony if committed by an adult;
(2) the child is 15 years of age or older; (3) there is probable cause
82
and, (4) after
to believe that the juvenile committed the act;
the juvenile
that
believe
to
grounds
reasonable
are
there
investigation,
the appropriate court having jurisdiction of the offense, after making the
following determinations:
(1) The child was 15 or more years of age at the time of the conduct charged;
(2) There is probable cause to believe that the child committed the act alleged;
(3) After an investigation including a mental and physical examination ... that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that:
(a) He is not amenable to care or rehabilitation in any facility designed
for the care, supervision, and rehabilitation of delinquent children;
(b) The safety of the community may require that he be placed under legal
restraint, including, if necessary, for the period extending beyond his
majority..
See Omo R. Juv. P. 30.
8DOHIo REv. CODE ANN.§ 2151.26(E) (Page Supp. 1973), which states: "Such transfer
abates the jurisdiction of the juvenile court with respect to the delinquent acts alleged
in the complaint"
81 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.26(C) (Page Supp. 1973): "Notice in writing of the
time, place and purpose of such hearing shall be given to his parents, guardian, or
other custodian and his counsel at least three days prior to the hearing."
82 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.352 (Page Supp. 1973): "A child, his parents, custodian, or other person in loco parentis of such child is entitled to representation by
legal counsel at all stages of the proceedings and if, as an indigent person, he is
unable to employ counsel, to have the court provide counsel for him..."
83 Omo Ray. CODE ANN. § 2151.26(E) (Page Supp. 1973); OHIo R. Juv. P. 30(E).
84 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553 (1966).
85 See In re Jackson, 21 Ohio St. 2d 215, 257 N.E.2d 74 (1970) (finding that a
standard of probable cause is sufficient in a waiver proceeding). See generally
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (defining probable cause).
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is not amenable to rehabilitation or that the safety of the community
88
may require legal restraint beyond his majority.
In a determination that there are reasonable grounds to believe that
the child is not amenable to rehabilitation, the Ohio Rules of Juvenile
Procedure provide the procedural guidelines. 87 However, these guidelines,
as set down in Juvenile Rule 30, do not totally encompass all the criteria
which are listed in the appendix to the Kent decision. A considerable
amount of latitude and discretion is still afforded the presiding juvenile
judge.8 8 If the waiver order does issue, the juvenile is turned over for
criminal prosecution, under the terms and conditions set by the juvenile
court pursuant to Juvenile Rule 30(F).89
In re Becker and Direct Appeal of Waiver Orders in Ohio
On July 10, 1974, the Supreme Court of Ohio spoke to this issue in
In re Becker.90 This decision unfortunately places in question the effective
availability of statutory juvenile rights to juveniles eligible for an order
waiving the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. The specific question
before the court was whether a transfer order, pursuant to Ohio Revised
Code Section 2151.26, was a final appealable order.
A complaint was filed in the Summit County, Ohio, Juvenile Court
against Richard Becker charging him with delinquency by reason of first
degree murder. After a proper probable cause hearing, as required by the
juvenile code and rules of procedure, the juvenile court relinquished
jurisdiction and transferred Becker to common pleas court for criminal
prosecution as an adult. Prior to his trial in common pleas court, Becker
appealed the waiver order to the Ninth District Court of Appeals of
Ohio, which court found that a transfer order was a final appealable
order.9 ' In so doing, the court overruled a motion by the State of Ohio
86 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.26(A) (3) (Page Supp. 1973).
87 OHIO R. Juv. P. 30(C):
Determinationof amenability to rehabilitation. In determining whether the child

is amenable to treatment or rehabilitative processes available to the juvenile
court, the court shall consider:
11)The child's age and his mental and physical health;
2) The child's prior juvenile record;
3) Efforts previously made to treat or rehabilitate the child;
4) The child's family environment; and
(5) School record.
8sSee State v. Carmichael, 35 Ohio St. 2d 1, 298 N.E.2d 568 (1973) (the scope of
"reasonable grounds" is left to discretion of court). But see People v. Fields, 388
Mich. 66, 199 N.W.2d 217 (1972) (finding a statute similar to Ohio's waiver statute
unconstitutional because it lacked suitable and ascertainable standards). See generally

S. DAvis, RIGHTS OF JuVNmEs 116-121 (1974), for a good overview on the general
vagueness of juvenile statutory standards involved in waiver proceedings.
89 Omo R. Juv. P. 30(F), reads as follows: "Release of transferredchild. The juvenile
court shall set terms and conditions for the release of the transferred child in
accordance with Criminal Rule 46."
90 39 Ohio St. 2d 84, 314 N.E.2d 158 (1974).
91In re Becker, C.A. No. 7353 (9th Jud. Dist. Ohio App., Jan. 22, 1974). In its
journal entry, the court stated: "We hold that a transfer order under Juv. R. 30 is a
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for dismissal and ordered a stay of proceedings in common pleas court
pending the final outcome of the appeal.
92
The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the court of appeals, basing
its decision primarily on the fact that a dispositional finding of
delinquency was not made in juvenile court. The court also relied heavily
on an Illinois case, People v. Jiles,93 finding that such an appeal would
provide for unnecessary delay in the disposition of Becker's innocence
or guilt regarding the alleged offense.

Prior to November 19, 1969, a transfer order pursuant to Ohio
Revised Code Section 2151.26 required the juvenile court to find the
95
4
juvenile delinquent before relinquishing jurisdiction. State v. Yoss, a
leading case on point, had found that such a transfer order was a final
appealable order based on Ohio Revised Code Sections 2501.02 and
2505.02, which deal with the jurisdiction of the Courts of Appeal
9
and the definition of "final" in the context of "final appealable order."
Subsequent to November 19, 1969, Ohio Revised Code Section 2151.26
was amended and the requirement of a finding of97 delinquency prior to
transfer was removed and thus is no longer needed.
The decision in Becker, then, effectively construes the right of appeal
as being based on the dispositional adjudication of delinquency rather
than on the finality of the juvenile court action in substantially affecting
the statutory rights of juveniles. In favoring the former rationale rather
than the latter, the abatement of the juvenile court's "exclusive" jurisdiction is given less weight than the importance of a speedy determination
final appealable order, because it terminates the Court's jurisdiction and prevents that
minor from being adjudged a delinquent and treated as a minor in the rehabilitative
process."
92 39 Ohio St. 2d 84, 314 N.E.2d 158 (1974).

93 43 Ill. 2d 145, 251 N.E.2d 529 (1969).
94
See State v. Carter, 27 Ohio St. 2d 135, 272 N.E.2d 119 (1971) (recognizing that
specific language is not required for a finding of delinquency and requiring that a
finding of delinquency is necessary to waive jurisdiction); In re Mack, 22 Ohio App.
2d 201, 260 N.E.2d 619 (1970) (the waiver order is conditioned on a finding of
delinquency). Please note that in both Carter and Mack, the waiver order was made
prior to the November 19, 1969, amendments to the Juvenile Code.
95 10 Ohio App. 2d 47,225 NXE.2d 275 (1967).
96
Omo REv.CoDE ANN.§ 2501.02 (Page Supp. 1973), reads in pertinent part:
mhe court of appeals shall have jurisdiction: (A) Upon an appeal upon
questions of law to review, affirm, modify, set aside, or reverse judgments or
ial orders of courts of record inferior to the court of appeals... including the
finding, order or judgment of a juvenile court that a child is delinquent,
neglected, or dependent... (emphasis added):
OHIo REv. CoDE AN. § 2505.02 (Page 1954), reads in pertinent part: "Final Order.
An order affecting a substantial right in an action which in effect determines the
action and prevents a judgment.. ." (emphasis added). Neither statute has been
amended since the determination in State v. Yoss, 10 Ohio App. 2d 47, 225 N.E.2d
275 (1967).
97 OHIo REv.CoDE ANN.§ 2151.26(A) (Page Supp. 1973). Accord, In re Becker, 39
Ohio St. 2d 84, 314 N.E.2d 158 (1974).
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of innocence or guilt. This seems to be directly in conflict with the issue
98
described in State v. Yoss as being one of jurisdiction.
9
The Becker court's reliance on the Illinois case of People v. Jileso
for support in its concern for speedy disposition seems somewhat shaded
since the statute relied on in Jiles was amended subsequent to that court's
decision.9° Under the previous Illinois statute, which was used in Jiles, the
state prosecutor made the decision whether to proceed criminally or
not. The juvenile judge's participation was limited to noting an objection
to the prosecutor's decision which brought about a hearing before the
chief judge of the circuit. 01 Although this method of determination is a
relatively unique situation, it logically implies that there is nothing to
appeal other than the prosecutor's discretion and the first "real decision"
made by a court is that of guilt or innocence at the criminal trial. Under
this particular set of circumstances, the Illinois court's concern for
speed in obtaining the first judicial determination, i.e., the guilt or
innocence of the juvenile, can readily be justified.

The Illinois statute, as amended prior to the Becker action, appreciably limits the prosecutor's discretion in removal matters by requiring a
hearing and investigation by the juvenile court to determine its propriety
under set criteria, 10 2 before a waiver order is granted. Now, the first
judicial determination effectively limiting substantial juvenile rights is
made by the juvenile court in the "critically important" waiver proceeding.
In considering one aspect of appealability, a Supreme Court
determination construing "finality," as applied in 28 U.S.C. Section
1291,103 is found to be helpful. In Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan
Corp., 104 the Court considered the finality of a denial of an indemnity
bond in stockholder litigation and stated: "The effect of the statute
[Section 1291] is to disallow appeal from any decision which is tentative,

98

10 Ohio App. 2d 47, 49, 225 N.E.2d 275, 276 (1967).

9943 IM. 2d 145, 251 N.E.2d 529 (1969).
100ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-7(3)

(1965') as amended P.A. 77-2096 § 1 (Jan.
1973), P.A. 78-341, § I (Oct. 1973) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974).
101 Id. See also Note, Due Process and Juvenile Court Removal Procedures, 67 Nw.
U.L. REv. 673 (1972).
102 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-7(3) (a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974) reads:
In making its determination on a motion to permit prosecution under the
criminal laws, the court shall consider among other matters: (I) whether there
is sufficient evidence upon which a grand jury may be expected to return an
indictment; (2) whether there is evidence that the alleged offense was committed
in an aggressive and premeditated manner; (3) the age of the minor; (4) the
previous history of the minor; (5) whether there are facilities particularly
available to the Juvenile Court for the treatment and rehabilitation of the
minor; and (6) whether the best interest of the minor and the security of the
public may require that the minor continue in custody.., beyond his minority.
103 Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1958), reads: "The courts
of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district
courts of the United States..

104 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
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informal or incomplete.... [S]o long as the matter remains open,

unfinished or inconclusive, there may be no intrusion by appeal."'01
Cohen also speaks of giving the provision of finality a practical
rather than technical construction. The adoption of this point of view

would seem to fit the benevolent role of the state in rehabilitation and
treatment. In addition, the waiver order relinquishing the "exclusive

jurisdiction" of the juvenile court leaves nothing open, unfinished or
incomplete as to the relinquishment, although it cannot be denied that
his guilt or innocence has not yet been determined.
In Lantsberry v. Tilley Lamp Co., 06 the Supreme Court of Ohio

spoke of the concept of final orders being based upon the rationale that
a court which makes an order which is not final retains jurisdiction
for further proceedings. In definition, the court stated in substance that
a final order is one disposing of the whole case or some separate and
distinct branch."" The waiver order is separate from the determination
of guilt in that it only determines which court wil hear the case on
the basis of distinct criteria as set out in the juvenile code.
But, a determination of finality in an order or its effect on substantial
rights does not in and of itself grant the right to an appeal.108 The Supreme
Court has never held that states must afford citizens the right of appellate
review as an element of due process, 109 and thus such a right must rest
upon statute. The applicable jurisdictional statute in Ohio is Ohio Revised
Code Section 2501.02 with Ohio Revised Code Section 2505.02 lending

itself to the definition of "final order."'' 0 It is upon the interpretation of
these two statutes that the right to an appeal will ultimately depend.
The Becker court made an interpretation which limits Ohio Revised
Code Section 2501.02 to a technical and literal reading. This in turn led
to a conclusion which excluded juvenile appeals not involving a specific
dispositional finding of delinquency, neglect, or dependency.'"
105 Id. at 546.

10627 Ohio St. 2d 303, 272 N.E.2d 127 (1971) (speaking particularly to final orders
in OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2505.02 [Page 1954]).
10727 Ohio St. 2d 303, 306, 272 N.E.2d 127, 129 (1971). Accord Roach v. Roach,
164 Ohio St. 587, 132 N.E.2d 742 (1956) (an order is final and appealable if it
divests a party of the right to have the court making the order place him in his
original position); Schindler v. Standard Oil Co., 165 Ohio St. 76, 133 N.E.2d 336
(1956) (finding that the sustaining of a general demurrer on grounds of misjoinder
where no petition amendment is possible is a final appealable order since it effectively
terminates a substantial right).
10See State v. Thomas, 175 Ohio St. 563, 197 N.E.2d 197 (1964). But see Malone
v. Malone, 119 Ohio App. 503, 199 N.E.2d 405 (1963) (a final order from which an
appeal may be taken is an order which affects a substantial right). But Cf. State v.
Lenhart, 116 Ohio App. 55, 186 N.E.2d 497 (1961).
109 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 58 (1967), citing Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956).
1o See notes 95 and 96 supra and accompanying text.
n1 See In re Bolden, 37 Ohio App. 2d 7, 306 N.E.2d 497 (1973), which construed
o temporary commitment order under Oreo REv, CODE § 2151.355 as not a final

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol8/iss3/11

18

Haskins: Juvenile Court and Direct Appeal From Waiver of Jurisdiction

Spring, 1975C

COMMENTS
IV.

CONCLUSION

An order waiving the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is "critically
important" as determined by the Supreme Court in Kent v. United
States.n12 The core issue in a waiver hearing is the question concerning
which court shall have jurisdiction of the juvenile and the case. However,
much more is determined than merely the court and location in which
the action will be prosecuted, for a number of important collateral issues
surround this question of jurisdiction and necessarily depend upon the
outcome of that finding by the juvenile court.
While Ohio can surely be seen as having a valid state objective in
limiting delay for the purpose of the administration of criminal justice, it
must initially be recognized that, although the ultimate objective of the
court to which the juvenile court relinquishes jurisdiction will be a
determination of the guilt or innocence of party, the primary objective at
a waiver hearing is a determination of proper jurisdiction. For the
purposes of finality and appealability then, the abatement of the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court, where no other judicial determination can possibly
follow therein, and the irreparable loss of substantial statutory juvenile
rights should weigh more heavily in the balance than a speedy determination of guilt or innocence which is not in issue at the waiver hearing.
The criteria for deciding whether a waiver order should issue are set
out by Ohio statute in what appear to be definitive terms.m Yet these are,
in reality, merely guidelines to be used by the juvenile judge. The weight
and interpretation that is to be given these criteria is dependent upon
the posture and attitude of each individual judge and thus may vary
considerably throughout the state.
Many factors can influence a juvenile judge's opinion, not the least
of which is his background, development, and understanding of not only
the law in general, but juveniles and juvenile law in particular. Indeed, it
was found in a 1969 poll of Ohio juvenile judges" 4 that in response to
the question, "[dloes public feeling concerning the offense influence your
decision?" 17% of the judges answering indicated an affirmative reaction.
The problems of the size of the caseload being handled by the court and
the financing available with which to operate might possibly enter the

appealable order although it affected a substantial right-the freedom of the juvenile.
But, in Bolden, the juvenile court still had a determination to make following the
temporary commitment order and retained jurisdiction in contrast to the abatement
of jurisdiction in waiver orders.
383 U.S. at 556. See text accompanying notes 23-25 supra.
REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.26(A) (Page Supp. 1973); OHIO R. Juv. P. 30. See
also S. DAvIs, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES (1974).
14 Comment, Waiver of Jurisdiction in Juvenile Courts, 30 OHIO ST. L.J. 132,
n12

D3 OHo

137-138 (1969). The national survey indicated a slightly lower percentage of 14% in

TAsx FoRCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 78.
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picture, as well as the political outlook of the elected juvenile judge in
dealing with an offense which might be touchy in the public eye.
Through the decision in Becker, the Ohio Supreme Court has taken
a place among a minority of states which deny a direct appeal from a
. 5
While the statements in the preceding paragraphs were
waiver order)not intended to be critical of any individual juvenile judge in Ohio, for
they are often the quickest to recognize and push for a needed reform
when it presents itself, they do bring to light some of the reasons
which may in fact underlie a waiver decision, and the resulting variables
which weigh heavily in the determination.
By not providing direct appeal from orders of waiver, Ohio has, in
a sense, left the door open to the possibility that a decision on waiver,
which is arbitrary or even due to mistake, will not be corrected until
the juvenile has been exposed to the criminal system. By that time, it
doesn't matter to the juvenile that the decision was unintentionally
arbitrary, or due to an oversight or mistake, for he has already been
subjected to that which the juvenile court was instituted to protect him
from in the interest of rehabilitation and reformation.
Thus, a motion to dismiss in criminal court and the possible appeal
from the ruling on that motion following the course of the trial, are in
fact, truly ".... hollow remed[ies] which cannot possibly give complete
relief, because by that time the juvenile will already irretrievably have lost
his right[s]..."us with all the safeguards accorded a minor gone. It is
from this point of view that the waiver order should be measured, always
keeping in mind the balance between a speedy determination and the
possible 50 or 60 years of life which remain to the juvenile, at least part
of which will see the juvenile back in the mainstream of society.*
THoMAs F. HAsKiNs, JR.

15 For some of the states allowing direct appeals from orders of waiver, see, e.g.,
P.H. v. State, 504 P.2d 837 (Alaska 1972); Graham v. Ridge, 107 Ariz. 387, 489
P.2d 24 (1971); In re Doe I, 50 Hawaii 537, 444 P.2d 459 (1968); In re Templeton,
202 Kan. 89, 447 P.2d 158 (1968); In re Trader, 20 Md. App. 1, 315 A.2d 528
(1974); Juvenile Dept. v. Johnson, 86 N.M. 37, 519, P.2d 133 (1974). For some of
the states which do not allow direct appeals from orders of waiver, see, e.g., People
2d 145, 251 N.E.2d 529 (1969); In re T.J.H., 479 S.W.2d 433 (Mo.
v. Jiles, 43 Ill.
1972); Commonwealth v. Croft, 445 Pa. 592, 285 A.2d 118 (1971); State v.
McArdle, 194 S.E. 2d 174 (W. Va. 1973).
216In re T.J.H., 479 S.W.2d 433, 437 (Mo. 1972) (Seiler, J., dissenting).
* Richard D. Becker was found guilty of First Degree Murder in Summit County,
Ohio, Common Pleas Court, following the remand by the Supreme Court of Ohio.
On October 2, 1974, his motion for a new trial was overruled and he was subsequently sentenced to the Ohio State Penitentiary for the remainder of his natural life.
An appeal was taken by Becker challenging not only his conviction but also the
juvenile court waiver order. While the case has been argued by counsel for both
parties, no decision had been rendered as of the date of printing. See State v. Becker,
C.P. No. 73-12-1265 (Summit County, Ohio C.P. Sept. 18, 1974), appeal docketed,

CA. No. 7616, 9th Jud. Dist. Ohio App., Dec. 12, 1974.
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